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On 11 February 2019 the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) and the
International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) joined forces to present the
Academic Day on Corporate Governance and Stewardship at the Amsterdam offices of
the Dutch institutional investor APG Group N.V. The basic purpose of the event was
educational, consistent with the missions of both ECGI and ICGN. It was a stimulating
day of cross-fertilising discussion and debate between practitioners (mainly from the
investor community) and academics doing research in governance. The format was
structured around four papers relating to corporate governance and stewardship. In
each case the papers were presented by an academic scholar as author /co-author, then
reviewed from an academic perspective by another academic discussant. The discussion
then broadened to include practitioners to bring their institutional perspectives to the
debate. This compendium report from the day’s proceedings provides a chronicle of the
key messages and differing arguments, giving the conference a broader reach beyond
those attending on the day.
The conference examined four papers on three primary topics: common ownership,
annual general meetings (AGMs) and the agenda on environmental, social and
governance (ESG) issues and investor engagement (two papers on this latter issue). The
first discussion, addressing the antitrust risks stemming from common ownership,
started from empirical evidence that may suggest anticompetitive effects and higher
fares in the airline industry as a possible result of common ownership. More specifically,
anticompetitive effects are alleged to arise in the form of reduced incentives for
companies to compete aggressively, in order not to undermine portfolio profits of their
“common owners”. At least in theory this creates the possibility of a tripartite trade-off
between, diversification, governance and competition. A lively debate ensued, during
which strong criticism was advanced on the actual existence of anticompetitive
outcomes and the scope of institutional investors’ intervention in firms’ decision-making.
The need for further empirical studies on the issue, in order to better understand the
mechanisms at play and to better inform potential policy initiatives, was a fundamental





The second paper focused on corporate voting and more specifically, on the decision of
shareholders that are not legally mandated to vote, of whether to vote. Building on the literature
on political voting, the paper shows, both theoretically and empirically, a freerider and an
underdog effect in corporate voting, with voters opposing a contentious voting resolution being
overrepresented because of the relatively high probability of being pivotal in the decision.
Conversely, voters supporting the resolution tend to free ride on other shareholders who are
legally mandated to vote. This results in an over-representation of the underdogs in the voting
outcome, with a probability of swinging the results (3,7% in the sample used by the authors). The
ensuing discussion explored its applicability in the European context of concentrated
ownership, and also in light of the new Shareholders Rights Directive.
 
The second half of the academic day focused on two papers relating to investor engagement on
ESG. The first paper studied a large proprietary dataset on ESG engagement. The study
concludes that ESG engagement positively impacts on the financial performance of the target
corporation. It then seeks the determinants of the engagement and its success, finding that
activists are more likely to engage with high profile companies with a higher than average
market share. The likelihood of a successful engagement correlates with the ESG scores of target
corporations, showing a higher probability of success for ex-ante high scores of the target. The
study finds little impact on real performances of the targeted corporations, with the notable
exceptions of the increase on sales, while target corporations usually increase their ESG scores
after the engagement.
 
The second ESG themed paper focused on the ESG engagement of the signatories to the
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) supported by the United Nations. It examines the
coordination of engagements on ESG projects across international investor networks. Results
show that in many cases a two-tier engagement strategy, combining influential local lead
investors and supporting international investors, increases project success and improves both





Following the welcome address by Claudia Kruse on behalf of APG, which hosted the
conference at its Amsterdam premises, George Dallas, ICGN Policy Director, spoke of ICGN’s
history of hosting practioner-academic conferences and the core purpose to cross-fertilise
between these communities and build mutual understanding through shared discussion of
governance related issues and research. He also expressed thanks to ECGI for co-partnering
with ICGN, noting the strong convening power that both institutions bring to governance
academics and professionals. Prof. Marco Becht (Solvay Brussels School, ECGI and CEPR) then
introduced the conference themes: 1) common ownership, specifically in relation to antitrust; 2)
annual general meetings (AGMs), and the endogeneity of participation; and 3) investor
engagement on ESG issues.
  
The first presentation was delivered by Martin Schmalz (Saïd Business School, Oxford and ECGI)
on his paper “Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership”, co-authored with José Azar and
Isabel Tecu. The paper contributes to the latest empirical literature focusing on the potential
anticompetitive effects of common ownership. The premise for the study is that Adam Smith’s
textbook model of self-interested competition assumes that the owner’s wealth is concentrated
in one firm. However, market share competition can reduce portfolio profits for a common
owner of competitors. Thus, the theoretical prediction is that firms might compete less
aggressively when there are common owners, compared to a situation in which separate sets of
investors own competitors. This may create antitrust risks in the form of an absence of external
shareholder incentives to compete, rather than increased incentives to collude. On this point,
Schmalz argues that overwhelming empirical evidence would be needed showing that
anticompetitive incentives stemming from common ownership never cause anticompetitive
outcomes, in order to reject such a prediction. Such evidence doesn’t exist.
 
To the contrary, in the paper, the authors study the U.S. airline industry and measure market
concentration arising from common ownership using a modified version of the Herfindhal-
Hirschman Index (“MHHI”), which depends not only on market shares but also on the extent to
which the same investors hold stakes in all firms in the industry. Additionally, they test whether
market concentration from common ownership has measurable effects on competition, by
correlating route level variation over time in the MHHI-HHI gap with variation in airfares on the
same routes. What emerges from the analysis rejects the standard theory of textbook-
competition, and thus suggests anti-competitive effects and higher airfares due to common
ownership.
 
Turning to consider what potential remedies could be devised, Schmalz clarified he didn’t
advocate for any particular proposal, or for any proposal, but also not for complacency. He noted
that it would be undesirable to take away voting rights and control from most large investors. At
the same time, even if funds could not diversify across competitors, households could still
diversify across funds. Therefore, if regulators were to decide to do something about the
problem, removing anticompetitive incentives from investors with voting rights seems a more
promising route than removing voting rights of investors with anticompetitive incentives.
 
He argued that it is time for regulators to develop an unbiased understanding of the problem,
noting that common ownership could affect the financial choices of firms. He also noted that,
despite the reduced incentives to compete on market share, there could be increased
procompetitive incentives to innovate for the benefit of the industry, which might even
overpower anticompetitive ones. Therefore, welfare effects are theoretically unclear.
 
In his discussion of the paper, Vikrant Vig (London Business School and ECGI) observed that the
simultaneous ownership of equity of competing firms by the same investor provides the
diversification that helps investors achieve their long-term investments goals. This observation
shifts the focus to considering whether the shareholder value to maximize is for individual firms
or – where common ownership exists– whether the focus is on the investor’s portfolio as a whole.
It raises the issue of the magnitude of anticompetitive incentives produced by common
ownership. In Vig’s view, the paper might have overstated the causality between the variables,




Why Common Ownership Creates Antitrust Risks
  
Lastly, he argued that more studies are still needed on this issue, since evidence is at best mixed
at the current stage. As such, common ownership in itself may not be a problem today, but it
might become one in the future. Still, Vig acknowledged that he finds it disturbing to drive the
policy discussion towards knee-jerk policy proposals. This view was shared during the ensuing
panel discussion, in which consensus was expressed on the fact that more caution should be put
on devising regulations, if there is no clear market failure to observe.
 
The empirical findings of the paper sparked a lively debate during the conference. More
specifically, Paul Lee (ICGN) took a very critical stance towards the paper, observing that he
perceives it as advancing more of a political argument than an effort to seek the truth. He
expressed the concern that a dangerous rush to policy seems to be underway, based on the
perception that investors exert too much influence or power. He emphasised what he perceived
to be the key issue of economic rationality, noting that over the period of the study virtually the
whole of the US airline industry had been through insolvency, so that it was no surprise that
there were changes in pricing over the period from what must have been pricing levels that did
not cover costs and the cost of capital. If the allegation that the airline industry is making excess
profits is true, we should expect to see the entrance of new competitors in the market. Market
share is not in practice a zero sum game if incumbent companies exploit consumers. Yet, since
this is not the case, Lee drew the conclusion that no anticompetitive effects have materialized in
practice.
 
Marceline Tournier (Nestlé) instead questioned the idea that the motivation of companies to
compete depended in any way on the interests of institutional investors, arguing that the desire
to win market share is the principal natural motivation of any company. She also stressed that
institutional investors are not motivated to discuss pricing strategies with companies, but rather
concentrate on high-level corporate governance issues, long-term strategies and financial
results. Tournier also emphasized the positive impact of exchanges between institutional
investors and companies, in particular positive outcomes for governance, sustainability and
contribution to society. For this reason, she expressed the worry that mere theories on the nature
of dialogue between institutional shareholders could lead to false assumptions, thereby
endangering these positive aspects.
 
In his reply, Schmalz emphasized the need to more extensively engage on these empirical
questions, in order to try and better understand such an effect factually, rather than shutting
down the debate. Then, he made the point that causation comes from theory, not from the
empirics of the paper, which are meant to test and reject theoretical hypotheses. On this point,
attention was drawn to the fact that the data and codes used for the empirical analysis have
been made available by the authors. Marco Becht confirmed this as a good practice, as it enables
the replicability of the study and makes the thesis properly testable.
 
Overall, the discussion brought out quite markedly a potential tension between diversification,
good governance and competition between firms having the same shareholders. The investor
perspective called for a greater ‘reality check’, particularly given that there is no evidence of
mechanisms in professional practice that lead to the types of potential threats to competition
posited in Schmalz’ paper. There seemed to be a general consensus to further engage in
empirical studies on the issue, particularly before contemplating potential punitive measures




The  Future  of  Shareholder  Meet ings :  Part ic ipat ion
in  Corporate  Vot ing
 
After the vibrant discussion on common ownership, the Academic Day programme continued
with the discussion of a traditional, as well as topical, issue in Corporate Governance-- corporate
voting participation-- by putting the spotlight on the future of Annual General Meetings (AGMs)
of Shareholders on both sides of the Atlantic.
 
The session started with the presentation by Moqi Xu (London School of Economics) of a
theoretical and empirical paper on voting participation in which Xu and coauthors model
corporate voting, while drawing from the political voting literature. The model aims to explain
when and why shareholders decide to vote and whether the results mirror the preferences of the
shareholder population. As in the political voting literature, the probability of being pivotal in the
decision is the primary factor in deciding whether to vote. However, unlike political voting, a
central feature of the corporation is the heterogeneity in the composition of the population, so
the model distinguishes between regular and discretionary voters. Regular voters always vote
because, for instance, they are mandated by law to do so (for example, mutual funds in the US);
whereas the voting decision of discretionary voters is based on a cost-benefit analysis that
accounts for the cost of voting and the probability of being pivotal.
 
The model predicts two main effects: (1) high homogeneity of shareholders’ preferences yield a
low participation rate since discretionary voters free-ride on regular voters; (2) contentious
decisions with a high level of disagreement yield a high participation rate of discretionary voters
opposing the majority (underdogs) since their probability of being pivotal in the decision is
relatively high.
 
This generates a misalignment between the population’s preference and the voting outcome,
with the underdogs being overrepresented in contentious decisions, having the possibility to
swing the results in their favour. From the design of the model, the magnitude of the underdog
effect is a function of the cost of voting and the probability of a swing in the voting results is
higher for intermediate levels of cost.
 
The theoretical predictions are empirically tested using a large dataset for US Corporation AGMs
with data spanning from 2003 to 2013 made up of 8,568 meetings with 18,520 non-standard
proposals. The analysis shows that there is a 3.7% probability of a swing in voting results, which is
consistent with the prediction of the model given that the cost of voting in the US is relatively
low.
 
Given such an interesting result in a US-based sample, Christoph Van Der Elst (University of
Ghent and Tilburg, ECGI) wondered whether the model and empirical testing could be adapted
to European corporations where ownership is often concentrated and controlling shareholders
are to be considered as regular voters. In particular, he pointed to a specific scenario in which an
adapted version of the model could shed light on European voting issues, such as votes where
the controlling shareholder must abstain because of a conflict of interest or in the cases where a





In his comments, Christian Strenger (HHL - Center for Corporate Governance) underlined the fact
that the sample period considered in the study covers the pre-stewardship codes era, so that the
situation could have changed in the meantime. He also stressed that the new regulatory
environment leaves increasingly less discretion for institutional asset managers, given the
comprehensive legal mandates to vote embedded in the new Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD
II). In answering, Xu underlined that somehow, the new regulatory environment could move
toward the validation of the model, since one of the findings is that institutional investors,
especially US mutual funds, mirrored quite closely the preferences of the shareholder
population.
 
The analysis also highlighted that both the type and the sponsor of the proposal matter for the
participation rate and the shareholder’s engagement, anticipating one of the crucial features
discussed in the afternoon sessions. Stressing the importance of the sponsor of AGM proposals,
Niels Lemmers (Dutch Association of Private Investors) discussed how the vote is the final
outcome of a long engagement process that might influence both the free-ride and the
underdog effect highlighted by Xu. As moderator, George Dallas noted that minority investors,
both retail and institutional, use votes to “signal” their concerns to investee companies, even if
they know it may not affect the ultimate outcome, and observed that the UK Corporate
Governance Code requires companies to take certain actions if the threshold of shareholders
voting against companies exceeds 20%. Initiatives of this nature to empower the voice of
minority shareholders may also provide new incentives for voting participation.
 
The final part of the session was devoted to discussing possible future developments for AGMs.
Several interventions highlighted the importance to develop a “hybrid” model of shareholders
meeting, where physical and remote participation are both possible during the AGM but direct
engagement is only possible for shareholders that are physically present at the meeting. Some
doubts were also expressed towards the application of the blockchain technology in AGMs, a




ESG and Corporate Governance
  
In the afternoon, the conference focused on investor activism, ESG issues and their impact on
corporate governance. The discussion began with the observation of the increasing amount of
assets under the management of “sustainable investors” and encompassed the presentation of
two papers on ESG activism. The first paper, by Tamas Barko (University of Mannheim) and
coauthors, scrutinized the determinants and the effects of ESG engagement using a proprietary
dataset. The second paper, by Elroy Dimson (University of Cambridge) discussed the importance
of investor coordination for effective ESG engagement. Subsequently, a panel discussion with
practitioners and academics discussed the topic of ESG engagement.
  
Shareholder  Engagement  on  Envi ronmenta l ,




The session began with the presentation of a paper by Tamas Barko (University of Mannheim)
and co-authors about the determinants and the results of ESG activism carried out by socially
responsible investors. In a broader sense, the research tries to shed light on the functioning of
“behind the door” engagement.
 
The study is based on a proprietary dataset that includes over 800 cases of engagements
involving 660 different companies. Crucially, the study embeds the ESG scores of targeted
companies provided by an independent rating organization, as opposed to similar previous
research, thus providing more solid and unbiased foundations to the empirical findings. The
empirical analysis is carried out through matching targeted companies with non-targeted
comparable ones.
 
After discussing the general framework, the data set and the methodology of the study, Barko
discussed the key areas of the paper: 1) the impact of engagement on financial performance; 2)
the characteristics that make companies more likely to be targeted by the activist; 3) the
determinants of a successful engagement and; 4) the impact of the engagement on the
performance of the targeted companies.
 
As for financial performance, the analysis concluded that ESG engagement makes financial
sense in the long run. During the period of engagement the return of targeted companies was
higher than the control group, but this was not statistically significant. Rather, during a 6-month
window after the engagement has successfully been concluded, the successfully engaged
companies yield a 5.5% additional return compared to unsuccessful engagements. Moreover, the
extra returns are higher for targeted companies that were in the lowest ESG rating quartile
before the engagement.
 
Subsequently, Barko explored the characteristics of the companies that are more likely to be
engaged, showing that the activist is more likely to engage in high profile cases. In fact, relative
to the matched sample, targeted companies have higher stock market performance, higher
market share and are covered by more analysts. Moreover, firms with high ESG performance are
more likely to be targeted, which can be explained by their higher level of receptiveness to ESG-
related issues.
 
Next, Barko suggested that the probability of success of the engagement increases for targeted
companies that were previously engaged and that have good ESG performance before the
engagement, highlighting the importance of the willingness of the target to be engaged, as
pointed out by Anjana Rajamani (Erasmus University Rotterdam). On this basis, Rajamani
challenged the possibility to interpret the causality of results, arguing that the behaviour of the
targets is endogenous once the activist put the targeted company in the spotlight, solving a
potential problem of “investor inattention”. Moreover, the analysis shows, unsurprisingly, that if
the activist asks for extreme corporate restructuring, the probability of success is lower than
lighter engagements asking for transparency.
 
Finally, Barko discussed the real effect of the engagement on the performance of the targeted
companies. The empirical analysis shows no results on accounting performance but for sales, the
level is increased by successful engagements as compared to non-successful ones. In this
respect, Rajamani compliments the authors for the analysis and pushes them to dig further,
looking at the ultimate customer (retail or wholesale) of the targeted company. Costanza
Consolandi (University of Siena) encouraged the authors to look for material factors of ESG (i.e.:
what drives performance without enhancing operating performance).
  
After the engagement, the ESG score of targets were in the lowest quartile of ESG performance
increases, independently of the success of the engagement. However, targets that had a high
ESG score experienced the opposite effect, with a reduction in their ESG score. This might
happen because the market and ESG analysts incorporate information about ESG vulnerabilities
of the targets that were unknown before the engagement. Rajamani highlighted that
categorizing an engagement as successful or unsuccessful might be problematic. In fact, the
authors use the classification provided by the activist, whereas even engagements that are
“unsuccessful” for the activist might be a success for the market at large. Indeed, for instance, the







The session continued with a presentation by Elroy Dimson (Cambridge and ECGI) on his co-
authored paper, which explores coordinated investor engagements on increasingly topical ESG
issues. The authors examine coordinated engagements by investment organizations on
principles of corporate social responsibility (CSR), focusing on engagement strategies, success
rates and financial outcomes of institutional investors who have coordinated their engagements.
To this end, they analyze observational data from the Collaboration Platform by the Principles for
Responsible Investment (PRI) supported by the United Nations, which facilitates shareholder
coordination. PRI is a global network for investors committed to responsible investment and
long-term, sustainable returns.
 
The dataset includes 31 PRI coordinated engagement projects, involving numerous targets,
commencing between 2007 and 2015. Looking at international networks of long-term
shareholders cooperating to influence firms on (environmental and social) E&S issues, they find a
42% project success rate (measured in terms of improvement in ESG scoring) and that the
median lead investor ownership in the target firm is 1.5 million dollars (US), while the size of
investment by the lead investor is not crucial, since modest group investments can also achieve
success. On this point, Torsten Jochem (University of Amsterdam) noted how there appear to be
very profitable investments being conducted at low cost.
 
Results show that target firms tend to be reputation-concerned and customer-focused.
Regarding the decisions to engage, they are seemingly characterized by a home bias, which is
justified by a lower cost of engagement, especially when the lead’s capability as E&S activist is
higher. Crucially, leadership elevates project success rates and improves financial and accounting
performance of the target firm. More specifically, the presence of a lead investor, particularly if
local, as well as the involvement of foreign supporting investors and the presence of an influential
investor coalition emerge as success determinants. In turn, success also has a number of effects,
among which are the higher average profitability (Returns on Assets) and sales growth of the
target, together with higher levels of pension fund holdings and higher lead-activist
shareholding. In many cases, a “two-tier engagement strategy” arises in which lead investors
conduct the dialogue and supporting investors collaborate with the former.
  




Jochem noted that the findings of the paper would suggest that asset managers from non-
western countries should benefit from the PRI platform for coordination. The findings suggest
that interventions are value-increasing, and more successful if the lead investor is domestic and
large supporting investors are involved. Yet, the reality looks different, since a large proportion of
participants are western and targets are most commonly based in the United States, United
Kingdom, France and Japan. A potential explanation for such an effect is that ESG issues may
not be a primary concern elsewhere.
 
Jochem also expressed his concerns about the potentially limited generalizability of the results
since  coordination may only occur when private negotiations fail; some large investors are
notably absent in the database; and the targets are mostly western, with above average ESG
ratings ex-ante.
 
As for the targets, since data show they are characterized by ex-ante worse performance and
more institutional ownership, Jochem warned that there might be a risk that the firms more
likely to recover are the ones picked as targets, or that targets are more likely to acquiesce on
projects if they are more likely to recover. In this sense, performance improvement could maybe
just represent a regression to the mean. Lastly, he suggests that surveys or interviews could be
used to gain additional insights on project engagement and thus strengthen the study overall.
The last part of the Academic Day was a panel discussion on ESG and Corporate Governance,
building on the previous presentations and including both practitioners and academic
discussants: Carola van Lamoen (Robeco); Wim Bartels (Corporate Reporting Dialogue); Eszter
Vitorino (Global Reporting Initiative); Costanza Consolandi (University of Siena). The discussion
was moderated by George Dallas (ICGN) and Marco Becht (ECGI).
 
Commenting on previous presentations, Van Lamoen underlined the crucial role of academic
research, such as the studies by Barko and Dimson, in highlighting the results of ESG
engagement. Reflecting on the recent history of active ownership, she highlighted the difference
between early comers and those who began to engage much later. In Europe active ownership
was adopted earlier by investors than for example in Asia; European asset managers started
engaging many years ago and Asian investors have more recently started to look at this. On the
coordination side, she agreed that collaboration with a clear and active lead member is often the
best way to ensure successful engagements. Nonetheless, some big passive investors are
engaging as well, but usually on their own. As for her personal experience in Robeco, she noted
that the Active Ownership team works in close cooperation with the portfolio management
teams and directly reports to the CIO. Such a position within the organization represents, in her
opinion, the best way to effectively impact investment decisions.
 
Bartels’s reflections returned to what is often the starting point of ESG engagement: corporate
reporting. He stressed the importance of providing investors with comparable information so
that it can be used fruitfully. He noted that there still is considerable room for improvement on
the comparability and consistency of corporate disclosure. Moreover, he stressed the crucial
importance of enhancing the accuracy and comparability of non-financial information in many
cases representing pre-financial information. From this perspective, there is a necessity to
improve the comparability of non-financial disclosure and, especially, to link such information to
the long-term impact of investments.
 
The importance of consistency of corporate reporting was also highlighted by Vitorino, who
clearly stated that investors and investees need to speak the same language, and nowadays that
is not always the case. Indeed, the link between corporate reporting and ESG engagement is 
  
clear and the more accurate and comparable disclosure will be, the easier it will be for investors
to seek opportunities of long-term value creation through ESG engagement. On the other side,
Vitorino brought attention to the problem of “greenwashing”, i.e.: the tendency of investors that
are not really focused on ESG engagement to jump on the wagon of sustainable and active
investment, signing up to the PRI commitment without acting accordingly. In this respect, she
welcomed the new tendency of PRI to screen its signatories and exclude the ones that do not
act in accordance with the its Principles, as this increases the credibility of the responsible
investment movement.
 
Finally, Consolandi broadened the scope of the discussion linking ESG activism with the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) developed by the United Nations to increase our
understanding of the “materiality” of ESG engagement. According to her recent research, SDGs
provide a useful, though imperfect, framework to assess the real impact of ESG engagement and
activities beyond financial performance. In this perspective, SDGs and ESG engagement are
closely linked and can help investors understand the systemic risks associated with their
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09:45 – 10:00 Welcome Remarks
 
Claudia Kruse, Managing Director Global Responsible Investment & Governance, APG Asset Management
George Dallas, Policy Director, ICGN
Marco Becht, Executive Director, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
 
10:00 – 11:15 Common Ownership
 
Why Common Ownership Creates Antitrust Risks 
Presenter: Martin Schmalz, Said Business School, Oxford and ECGI
 
Academic discussant: Vikrant Vig, London Business School and ECGI
Practitioner discussant: Marceline Tournier, Nestlé
 Investor discussant: Paul Lee, ICGN
 
11:30 – 12:45 The Future of Shareholder Meetings: Participation in Corporate Voting
 
 Free-Riders and Underdogs: Participation in Corporate Voting 
Presenter: Moqi Xu, London School of Economics
 
 Academic discussant: Christoph Van der Elst, University of Tilburg, Ghent University and ECGI
Practitioner discussant: Christian Strenger, HHL - Center for Corporate Governance
Investor discussant: Niels Lemmers, Dutch Association of Private Investors
 
14:00 – 17:00 ESG and Corporate Governance
 
 Shareholder Engagement on Environmental, Social, and Governance Performance
Presenter: Tamas Barko, Mannheim University
Academic discussant: Anjana Rajamani, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam
 
Coordinated Engagements
Presenter: Elroy Dimson, University of Cambridge and ECGI
 
Academic discussant: Torsten Jochem, University of Amsterdam
 
Panel Discussion 
 Wim Bartels, Corporate Reporting Dialogue
Carola van Lamoen, Robeco
Costanza Consolandi, University of Siena









The ECGI is an international scientific non-profit association which provides a forum for debate
and dialogue focusing on major corporate governance issues and thereby promoting best
practice. It is the home for all those with an interest in corporate governance offering
membership categories for academics, practitioners, patrons and institutions.
 
Its primary role is to undertake, commission and disseminate research on corporate governance.
Based upon impartial and objective research and the collective knowledge and wisdom of its
members, it can advise on the formulation of corporate governance policy and development of
best practice. In seeking to achieve the aim of improving corporate governance, ECGI acts as a
focal point for academics working on corporate governance in Europe and elsewhere,








Established in 1995 as an investor-led organisation, ICGN's mission is to promote effective
standards of corporate governance and investor stewardship to advance efficient markets and
sustainable economies world-wide. Our policy positions are guided by the ICGN Global
Governance Principles and Global Stewardship Principles, which are implemented by:
Influencing policy by providing a reliable source of investor opinion on governance and
stewardship; Connecting peers at global events to enhance dialogue between companies and
investors around long term value creation; and Informing dialogue through education to
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